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BOOKS REVIEWED
Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. By Mauro Cappelletti. Indian-
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1971. Pp. x, 117. $8.50.
REVIEW I
Professor Cappelletti's lucid and scholarly summary of judicial review in the
western world is an excellent introduction to the subject. His use of the compar-
atist approach is an excellent illustration of the merits of this methodology,
since it is replete with insights into contemporary judicial review which we
would otherwise lack. The development of legal institutions, perhaps even more
than juridical concepts, can valuably be studied through a comparison of their
evolution and development in other legal systems.
The major part of Judicial Review in the Contemporary World is devoted to a
straightforward comparative and historical analysis of judicial review. The au-
thor does, however, advance certain propositions which raise jurisprudential
questions. The persuasiveness or non-persuasiveness of these propositions does
not detract from the general validity and importance of the comparatist law
aspects which comprise the major part of the book. At the same time, however,
the jurisprudential propositions asserted are quite important in their own right
and merit comment, subject of course to the recognition that Professor Cappel-
letti has offered in Judicial Review only a brief outline of these assertions with-
out a full exposition of his thoughts.1
The author's major thesis is that modem judicial review represents a synthesis
of the "two seemingly contradictory schools of thought"--natural law and posi-
tivism.2 This "synthesis" is said to have developed in three stages. First, modem
written constitutions were conceived principally to codify or "positivize" certain
metalegal ideals and values which constituted a "higher law" similar to tradi-
tional natural law theories. The second step was the development of "rigid"
constitutions which conferred a "relative immutability" on the higher law. Third,
judicial review was established in order to guarantee that the constitution re-
main separate from and above the legislative power.3 As one example of the first
stage of this evolutionary process the author notes medieval England where
both crown and parliament were said to be subject to a higher unwritten law;
the second stage or "positivization" of that higher law occurred with the Glori-
ous Revolution which initiated an era of "legal justice" characterized by the
primacy of parliament. The third stage occurred in the United States when
1. See AL Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 97 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Cappelletti].
2. See id. at vii. The author also asserts that judicial review reveals much about our
psychological responses to the tyrannies of the twentieth century, particularly those of
Fascism and Nazism. Id. at viii.
3. Id.
1007
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Chief Justice Marshall firmly established the right of judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison.4
Professor Cappelletti does not content himself with describing this evolution-
ary process as an important part of legal history essential to a comparatist study
of judicial review. He goes on to extrapolate from it a jurisprudential theory:
[t]he framework of modem constitutions and judicial review synthesize the ineffective
and abstract ideals of natural law with the concrete provisions of positive law.
Through modem constitutionalism, in short, natural law, put on an historical and
realistic footing, has found a new place in legal thought.5
The author also argues that the modem comparative school can combine the
virtues of natural law and positivism by applying the "realistic methods" of
positivism in order to establish the common elements of and values expressed in
legal institutions. The comparative method is asserted to be the indispensable
tool in pursuing this "common core" of legal systems:
Constitutions express the 'positivization' of higher values; judicial review is the
method for rendering these values effective; and the comparative method is the
instrument of the movement towards harmonization and of the search for interna-
tionally acceptable values. These three are essentially linked together and form an
integral part of the new direction in modem jurisprudence.0
This attempt to place the comparatist method on a jurisprudential basis
should be examined together with and in light of the author's beliefs that judicial
review represents a synthesis of positivism and natural law as well as the latter's
recent reemergence as a major force in legal philosophy.
The asserted synthesis between positive and natural law is highly questionable
and unfortunately not established in the author's brief account in Judicial Re-
view. Professor Cappelletti asserts that "[t]raditional natural law theories were
doomed to failure because they could not give substance to their airy formula-
tions and had no instrument to put them into effect." 7 Commentators other than
Professor Cappelletti have lumped together under the rubric "natural law" such
diverse thinkers as Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. (Perhaps a jurisprudent might
some day apply the comparatist method to discover the "common core" of
natural law theories.) Given such variety it is with some trepidation that one
criticizes the author's "natural law." But the same variety, and its attendant
confusion, require close scrutiny of Professor Cappelletti's invocation of "natural
law."
A fruitful distinction might initially be made between "higher law" theories
and "natural law" theories. The term "higher law" is a broader generic term and
is defined here to include any values, ideals or principles 8 against which positive
law can be measured. Such measurement has been used in a number of ways-
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see Cappelletti at 41-43.
S. Cappelletti at viii.
6. Id. at x.
7. Id. at ix.
8. For present purposes it is unnecessary to refine further the "higher laws" into ideals,
rules, principles, etc.
for example, to justify disobedience to positive law on "moral" grounds or to
assert the "invalidity" of positive law.0 "Natural law" is one kind of "higher
law" theory in which the higher law is said to be based ultimately on a nation-
ally ordered "nature. '10 "Higher law," on the other hand, can have any ultimate
basis; for example, values held by a group of individuals or society at a given
time. The ultimate basis--"nature"--might initially appear to narrow the num-
ber and types of values included under a natural law theory. In practice, how-
ever, the vagaries of the word "nature" are so boundless that a distinction be-
tween "natural" and "higher" laws is often difficult to perceive."1
Professor Cappelletti does not indicate in Judicial Review whether he refers to
"higher" laws or "natural" laws and he uses both terms interchangeably. When
he speaks of the "positivization" of natural law through modem constitutions,
he appears to refer to the broader meaning of "higher" law. So viewed, his argu-
ments cannot so easily be used by partisans of natural law in their never-ending
struggle against the legal positivists-a struggle often marked on both sides more
by intensity of emotion than refinement of argument. More importantly, Pro-
fessor Cappelletti appears to misconceive the function and role of higher law and
natural law theories. As stated above, both have served primarily as criteria
against which to evaluate positive law. Both, therefore, assume the existence
of positive law. Formulation in written constitutions of certain values, claimed
to be part of the higher (or natural) law, may, as Cappelletti asserts, help con-
cretize the "airy formulations" of prior higher law theories. But this concretiza-
tion operates or is meaningful only in a particular society at a given time. The
"positivization" does not negate the possibility of or argument for a higher or
natural law, for written constitutions become part of the positive law. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court in the nineteenth century alluded in a number
of opinions to natural law or higher law as a body or set of rules existing
separately from the Constitution.12 The existence of a modem written constitu-
tion, "rigid" or otherwise, does not necessarily preclude appeals to a "higher"
law when that constitution appears to permit or require conduct abhorrent to
the appellant. Thus, Dr. King appealed to the principles of "natural law" in
his letter from the Birmingham jail.' 3 To adopt Professor Cappelletti's language,
9. For example, Aquinas discusses natural law in the context of determining the moral
duty to obey or disobey positive enactments. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica ques. 90-97.
10. For example, Kelsen has defined natural law as a higher order of values which is
said to be immanent in empirical reality. Following this definition, Plato's legal philosophy is
not natural law but rather idealism. See Kelsen, Plato and the Doctrine of Natural Law, 14
Vand. L. Rev. 23, 26-34 (1960).
11. Indeed, the more skeptical will cite not the Ethics of Aristotle as the genesis of "natural
law" theories, but rather the Rhetorics wherein he offers the practical advice to litigants to
appeal to a higher law or to natural law whenever the positive law is contrary to their posi-
tion or argument.
12. E.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756 (1883); Loan
Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874). See also Haines, The Law of Nature
in State and Federal Judicial Decisions, 25 Yale LJ. 617 (1916).
13. See letter from Martin Luther King to The New Leader, June 24, 1963, at 3. See
also Law and Morality 152-54 (Hook ed. 1964).
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higher law (or natural law) principles can still be employed to evaluate the
"positivization" of society's values in a written constitution. And it is the legal
system's recognition of the legitimacy of such a challenge which will determine
whether such an appeal to a higher law will be successful in a given case or
situation.
Rather than assert the "positivization" of natural law, it might be less confus-
ing simply to describe the development of modern constitutions and judicial
review as an attempt to formulate certain fundamental values held strongly by a
particular society, values which cannot be easily overriden by the government.
Judicial review in such a scheme is an additional safeguard against legislative
infringement of these values. Such a political explanation describes more accu-
rately the American experience where the jurisprudential explanation developed
more as a rationalization. On the other hand, perhaps the post-war development
of judicial review in western Europe, particularly in West Germany and Italy,
was guided from the beginning by jurisprudential considerations as well as by
political reaction against prior legislative and executive excesses.
In either case, it is difficult to see what is added to the description by the
introduction of terms like "natural" law. This perverse itch to escalate discussion
by use of such language is common to all of us--probably because the term
"nature" or "natural" has a persuasive quality which is thought to lend stronger
support to the values one is asserting. This is not to say that natural law theories
are necessarily meaningless or mere rhetorical devices. 14 It is only that the at-
tempt to articulate certain strongly held values in written constitutions should
not be explained in terms of "natural" or "higher" law, for such an explanation
brings with it the assorted and confusing jurisprudential connotations associated
with those terms. On the other hand, "natural law" may be a useful tool in
explaining the origins and development of the values positivized in the constitu-
tion. Natural law theories might also be used to persuade the body politic to
incorporate other values into the constitution.
As remarked above, the crucial question is whether and under what circum-
stances the legal system (including executive and legislative action) recognizes
the legitimacy of an appeal to a higher law where such law is said to conflict
with the positive law of the constitution and other legislation. This question is
obfuscated when it is asserted that higher law or natural law "invalidates"
positive laws; it is more accurate to state that natural or higher law principles
can be used to attempt to justify disobedience to positive law or to persuade
others to change the positive law or not enforce it in a particular situation.
Professor Cappelletti also asserts that modem constitutionalism overcomes
the defect of legal positivism which is "limited to the actual application of the
14. Natural law theories are certainly worthy of attention when they are based upon an
analysis of human nature as seen biologically, psychologically, etc., as with the case of
Aquinas when the theological underpinnings are removed.
H.L.A. Hart has recently offered a "minimum content" of natural law based ultimately
on man's instinct for self-preservation. See H.LA. Hart, The Concept of Law 189-95 (1961).
[Vol. 401010
BOOKS REVIEWED
law on a purely national level" and which cannot "satisfy the grander desires
of man."1 5 Such a limitation does not necessarily exist, however. While the
positivism of Austin is based on a national "sovereign'" 0 and that of Kelsen on
a fictitious "Grundnorm,"1 7 it would not be an unwarranted distortion of legal
positivism to extend it to include some type of supranational sovereignty. The
tools and merits of positivism and of analytical jurisprudence might be applied
to a legal system which rests on such a supranational sovereignty even where
there is a written constitution which sets forth certain fundamental values.
Finally, the author's emphasis on the comparatist method as an indispensable
tool in discovering the "common core" of legal systems is not enhanced by the
assertion that it combines the virtues of both natural law and positivism.' 8
Comparative law is invaluable in that it provides a vehicle for the collection of
data about different legal systems. Such a gathering of materials was undertaken
to some degree by the Romans in compiling the ires gentium or law of nations.
But a mere gathering of empirical data is in itself insufficient to formulate a
"natural" or "higher" law. Further analysis or intellectual refinement such as a
phenomenological approach is necessary.' 9 The importance of the comparatist
method may well be obscured or subject to irrelevant partisan criticism when
unnecessary jurisprudential claims are made for it
BARRY HAWK*
REVIEW II
Since the eighteenth century many aspects of American constitutional theory
and practice have profoundly influenced constitution makers throughout the
world.' Until recent decades, however, outside of Latin America, it was the rare
legal system that chose to emulate the American experience with judicial review
of the constitutionality of legislation. A worldwide movement toward judicial re-
view began after World War I and gathered momentum after World War II. Na-
tion after nation has now adopted some form of judicial review as a means of
15. Cappelletti ix.
16. See J. Austin, 1 Lectures on Jurisprudence 151-60 (4th ed., Campbell 1876). See also
RH. Eastwood & G.W. Keeton, The Austinian Theories of Law and Sovereignty (1929);
S. Shuman, Legal Positivism: Its Scope and Limitations 178-88 (1963).
17. See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 8, 193-221 (1967). See also Hughes, Validity and
the Basic Norm, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 695 (1971).
18. Cappelletti ix-x.
19. See, e.g., McBride, Towards a Phenomenology of International justice, Law, Reason,
and justice 137 (1969).
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
1. See generally C.J. Friedrich, The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad (1967);
Lenhoff, America's Cultural Contributions to Europe in the Realm of Law, 16 Buffalo L. Rev.
7 (1966).
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protecting the integrity of constitutionally proclaimed rights, 2 often looking to
the American experience for some guidance.3
Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, exclusive of index, contains one
hundred succinct pages of clear, lean, and voluminously footnoted prose which
examines the ideological and historical background of various systems of judicial
review. In additon, it asks the questions which would come to the mind of a
lawyer or political scientist as to the ways in which the various systems operate.
The author, who is Professor of Law at the Universities of Stanford, California,
and Florence, Italy, analyzes how ideological factors inhibited and continues to
inhibit the adoption of judicial review in some nations which genuinely or osten-
sibly strive for the protection of human rights. For example, in France the con-
cept of separation of powers (without a countervailing concept of checks and
balances) is deemed logically to exclude the possibility of judicial interference
with the legislative branch of government.4 On the other hand, " [i ] n the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries . . . judicial review was repudiated as one
aspect of the 'bourgeois doctrine' of the separation of powers. All powers are
united in one supreme organ .... ,,5 When historical forces collide with ideology,
interesting results occur. The fascist experience in Germany and Italy caused
progressive Germans and Italians in the aftermath of World War II to repudiate
the traditional conceptions of separation of powers which they had shared in the
pre-fascist era with the French. Both of these countries opted for the establish-
ment of a constitutional court. Similarly, reaction to the Stalinist experience
contributed to the adoption and implementation of judicial review in Yugoslavia
and its adoption in Czechoslovakia in 1968, an adoption which, however, has not
received concrete implementation. 7
The widespread acceptance of the concept of judicial review has caused consti-
tutional draftsmen and courts to raise and solve certain common problems. This
book pries into such questions as whether a decision declaring a law to be un-
constitutional operates retroactively or prospectively and what criteria are utilized
in making such a decision in various legal systems.8 Other matters analyzed in-
clude the dichotomy between centralized systems in which the power of judicial
review is focused in a special Constitutional Court and a system in which this
Power is dispersed, as in the United States, throughout the court system.9 The
author also discusses the remedial processes which are available to a party who
2. Review of the constitutionality of legislation by non-judicial bodies also exists in some
jurisdictions. See M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 1-16 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as Cappelletti].
3. The American experience has been highly influential. It should be pointed out, however,
that the theory of judicial review had been espoused and occasionally applied in continental
Europe before the founding of the North American colonies. The theory was rejected and
the practice suppressed by the French revolution. Id. at 1-36.
4. Id. at 12-18, 23-24.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 27, 51-52.
7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 88-96.
9. Id. at 46-68.
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wishes to attack the constitutionality of legislation1 ° and the effects of a success-
ful attack. In some jurisdictions a decision declaring a law unconstitutional has
the effect of abrogating the law, whereas in others it is merely operative as res
judicata between the parties."' In the latter case, however, if the doctrine of
stare decisis is operative within the legal system, the same practical result as
abrogation may occur.-2 This is particularly true if the decision was rendered in
a class action.' 3
Judicial Review in the Contemporary World is not a mere compilation of rules
of constitutional procedure in effect in various jurisdictions of the world. Rather
it is an integrated discussion of these rules. The discussion makes clear that de-
spite significant differences existing in style and substance among the various
legal systems of the world, there is a common core 4 of issues which have arisen
in some form or another in all nations which genuinely or ostensibly cherish the
rule of law. And while the solutions to these issues are far from identical, the
author makes a convincing case that converging trends are discernible in the
various jurisdictions studied.15 For example, while to an extent Europe, Asia, and
Africa have looked to the United States for guidance in the matter of judicial
review, the United States Supreme Court behaves increasingly like a European
"constitutional court" by discouraging applications for certiorari in other than
constitutional cases and by eroding requirements such as "standing" and "justici-
ability."
This book, although clear and comprehensive in itself, takes on an added dimen-
sion when viewed in the context of the author's other writings.10 Several basic
themes run through his body of work: (1) the ideological foundation of even the
most banal and technical rule of law, (2) the convergence of legal systems in
common law, civil law and socialist orbits as today's competing ideologies develop
a common core, mixes of libertarian and social values which differ from each
other only in degree and which spring from a common medieval and classical
civilization; and (3) the need to make all law responsive to social goals while
preserving libertarian values. A fourth theme also finds its way into this volume.
The author recognizes that constitutions are attempts to effectuate in concrete
10. Id. at 19-24, 69-84.
11. Id. at 85-88.
12. Where the decision is merely operative between the parties and stare decisis is not
recognized in the legal system, various solutions have been adopted. For example, in lexico,
amparo decisions do not have the effect of binding precedent "unless it is one of a series of five
consecutive amparo decisions on the same point, holding the same way, uninterrupted by one
to the contrary." H.L. Clagett, The Mexican Suit of "Amparo," 33 Geo. L.J. 418, 437 (1945)
(footnote omitted).
13. Cappelletti 57-58.
14. On the concept of "common core" see R.B. Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal
Systems: An Emerging Subject of Comparative Study, in XXth Century Comparative and
Conflicts Law: Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema 65 (1961).
15. Cappelletti 66-68, 84, 97-100.
16. The bulk of the author's work is in Italian. In English, the best introduction to his
theories is Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms and Trends in
Western and Eastern Europe, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 847, 881-85 (1971).
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and positive terms man's persistent belief in a "higher law" that rises above the
degrees of despotic tyrants and even of democratically elected legislatures. Ac-
cording to the author, prior attempts to state the existence and content of a
"higher" "natural law," common to all mankind, whether based on religious belief
or on the Enlightenment concept of the omnipotence of human reason, resulted in
"airy formulations."'1 7 This book, in part, is a statement of his belief that "natural
law" or some modem counterpart of it will be found by the comparative method
applied "in the search for common elements in legal institutions of various nations
and the common values expressed in them."' 8
The one disappointing fact about this book is one of omission. A significant
development of recent decades has been the creation of supra-national tribunals
embodying a tentative resolution of man's quest for a concrete way to assure the
implementation of higher law. In economic matters, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities is one such tribunal and the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms establishes another. These courts
are engaged in testing the validity of legislation against an international "consti-
tution." If the goal is to devise methods to prevent the deprivation of funda-
mental norms by a state against its people, judicial review by a court within the
state has often proved an effective device. When this device fails, however, judi-
cial review on an international plane-where it exists-operates as an additional
safeguard. Moreover, a study of such international tribunals aids in the discovery
of core concepts and values acceptable to at least all the powers ratifying the
treaty which establishes the tribunal. This volume does not, however, purport to
exhaust every aspect of judicial review and what is a disappointing omission to
this reviewer may be perfectly logical to other readers who may find it a thorough
comparative approach toward national legal systems.
In sum, the book under review, brief as it is, contains something for a wide
variety of readers-political scientists, legal technicians and legal philosophers as
well as any lawyer or law student willing to expand his intellectual horizons.
JOSEPH M. PtRuLLo*
The Politics of Disorder. By Theodore J. Lowi. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
1971. Pp. xx, 193. $6.95.
The litany of the past few years has it that American society is coming un-
glued and that its political and social institutions are failing. Naturally, such an
alarming state of affairs calls forth a wide range of speculation as to causes and
cures. Especially in the United States, sounding the tocsin unlooses a deluge of
academic inquiry, make-work, and punditry. The sociologists rush about to
measure the extent of anomie among 18 to 19 year old freshmen, psychologists
muse about the correlation between middle-class upbringing and anarchistic
tendencies, and the political scientists construct once and future models to find
17. Cappelletti ix.
18. Id.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University.
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a publishable theory. The voice of the social scientist classifier is heard in our
land; we have to concern ourselves with the old left, the new left, the radicals,
the black, brown and red power people, the separatists (also in various colors),
the dropouts, the alternative society folks, etc. Above the entire scene hover the
academic vultures, professing scientific detachment while weaving their preju-
dices deep into the fabric of their plethora of articles, papers and books.
Theodore Lowi is a professor of political science at the University of Chicago,
often billed as a distinguished political scientist of the left (new). Lowi is
apparently not regarded as an embracer of radical realpolitik, but rather as a
scholar of politics who can tell us "what it all means," and "where we go from
here." In a precursory volume, The End of Liberalism,' we were told what it
all means, and in this book we are to receive instruction in how to reform our
political system so as to effect the fundamental changes in our society necessary
for salvation.
One difficulty in stating Lowi's thesis compactly is that this book, as is so
common nowadays, is a pastiche of several journal articles and essays previously
authored by Lowi2 He begins with a prologue on what happens when govern-
mental institutions fail, followed by an analysis of group politics in relation to
societal change, a discussion of governmental structure and political repression,
an essay on the role of higher education in political reform and, finally, an alter-
native approach to governing our society.
The basic argument presented by Lowi goes something like this:
1. Our industrial society is governed by a political system which recognizes
and responds to group interests and pressures;
2. Groups which are formed for the purpose of seeking change in societal
institutions eventually calcify into rigid mini-institutions themselves un-
responsive to the need for change and innovation, a process Lowi calls "the
iron law of decadence; "3
3. Because group pressures result in government by compromise and because
most recognized groups (e.g., organized labor) have already succumbed to
the "iron law of decadence," all governmental efforts billed as change or
social progress are but mummery and dissemblance. In desperation, people
then rely on charismatic leadership for salvation;
4. Leadership is a dangerous principle primarily because it is antithetical to
the rule of law;
5. Intelligent use of disruption and disorder is a means of breaking the vicious
circle of forming groups to press for change only to be co-opted by com-
promise programs full of sound and fury but accomplishing nothing. As
Lowi states, "[c]haos is better than a bad program.14
1. T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority
(1969).
2. Chapter Three appeared as Decentralization-To Whom? For WThat?, 9 Mdway 45
(Winter 1969); parts of Chapter Four were published as Prognosis for Crackdown: The
Wheel of Panic, 208 Nation 624 (1969); Chapter Six appeared as The Patient Has All the
Blood He Has, 3 PS 107 (1970) ; Chapter Seven was published as Yesterday's Revolutionists:
The Faculty and the Tragedy of the University, 10 Midway 3 (Winter 1970).
3. T. Lowi, The Politics of Disorder 7-31 (1971).
4. Id. at 180.
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The solution Lowi offers to lead us out of the miserable state of affairs de-
scribed above is quite simple. We must change from a government of, by, and
for group interests based on the principle of leadership and embrace juridical
democracy-government of laws.5 Rule of laws, not of men-Lowi proclaims the
slogan as though he received the tablets from on high. Of course, Lowi doesn't
mean law in the generic sense; he is careful to point out that he always means
"good law."6
Now then, what can one make of Lowi's thesis? Even if you take his analysis
of group politics with a grain of salt and grant that overstatement may be ac-
ceptable for making a point, Lowi's "iron law of decadence" is a ludicrous sci-
amachy. He uses the examples of the Grange movement, organized labor and
business organizations to demonstrate the decay of groups formed to promote
change. These examples are supposed to "prove" that all groups move through
a cycle which inevitably leads to decadence. His analysis is bolstered by an at-
tempt to scientifically outline the stages of social movements,7 al attempt which
this reviewer would call, at best, mumbo-jumbo.
Turning to Lowi's solution of "juridicial democracy" 8 one can only say that
he exhibits the naive view of jurisprudence that is noticeable among many po-
litical scientists. The "rule of law" as understood by Lowi is straight out of
Dicey 9 without any sign of appreciation of the complexities of legal philosophy
in defining "law" (much less the dilemmas posed by the concept of "good law").
Lowi's view that all we need to set this country straight is to substitute good
law for strong political leadership is so simplistic and untutored as to defy
constructive criticism. What Lowi needs is a good course in legal philosophy l
All in all, Lowi's thesis is unconvincing. He offers the reader an unending
series of cliches and aphorisms which contribute not one whit toward solving
the perennial problem of balancing stability and change in a modern industrial
society. Even where this reviewer agrees with Lowi, as where he argues that
dissent and political disorder are useful and indeed necessary devices in moving
society forward, Lowi unfortunately fails to go beyond stating the patently
obvious. The creative value of dissent needs to be understood in the context of
drawing the lines between dissent, civil disobedience, and violence on one hand,
and official discouragement, harassment, and repression on the other. These are
the important issues of our time, but Lowi's book fails to touch upon them.
MORTON GiTELMAN*
5. Id. at 181.
6. Id. at 181-82.
7. Id. at 35-53.
8. Id. at 58-61, 185-86.
9. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). Dicey
is cited merely as an example of the relationship between Lowi's superficial understanding of
law in the jurisprudential sense and the nineteenth century British school of romantic analyti-
cal jurisprudence.
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
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The Effectiveness of International Decisions: Papers and Proceedings of
The American Society of International Law. Edited by Stephen M.
Schwebel. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1971. Pp. 538. $19.50.
The question of the effectiveness of international decisions is a constant
curiosity to international lawyers and of broad interest to laymen longing for an
international order capable of dealing effectively with issues of war and peace.
When one think of the League of Nations and even of the United Nations,
skepticism seems to be the order of the day. The papers and proceedings pub-
lished in this book are not specifically designed to dispel that skepticism. They
do, nevertheless, offer some hope.
The first 361 pages of the book are devoted to papers which present a broad
panorama of the decision-making activities of such diverse international organiza-
tions as the International Monetary Fund, the International Labor Organization,
the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the
GATT and the European Economic Community. At least nine of the organiza-
tions dealt with are clearly specialized or "functional." Four of the remaining six
are regional organizations and the other two are the United Nations and the
GATT. In varying degrees, the reader receives the impression that the most
effective decisions are made by the functional organizations, followed by the
regional organizations and finally the United Nations. The papers dealing with
the functional organizations often point out what is probably widely appreciated,
that such organizations are in the business of dispensing clearly appreciated bene-
fits in forums not highly charged with political issues. As a result, national
interests are not as likely to collide and the benefits gained from compliance
with the organization's requirements exceed the sovereignty lost in maintaining
membership in good standing.
Unfortunately, the papers as a group very heavily emphasize the mechanics of
decision-making and methods of implementation within the specific organizations.
Few writers give significant attention to the broader problem of the ingredients
common to those international institutions whose decisions tend to be "effective,"
or the extent to which effective decision-making techniques in one institution
might be capable of incorporation into weaker international organizations. The
reader must rely solely on his own judgment.
The balance of the book contains the edited transcript of the discussions held
at the Villa Serbelloni, in Bellagio, Italy, in 1967 and attended by twenty-one
international practicing lawyers and scholars representing many of the functional
international organizations and various universities. The theme of the meeting
was: "By what measures may the decisions of international organizations (in
their various possible forms, ranging from recommendations for action by mem-
ber states to decisions that are legally binding) be made effective?"' The first
few pages of transcript seemed to involve a warming-up process in which each
participant had a comment to make bearing little or no relationship to the coin-
1. Schwebel, The Effectiveness of International Decisions: Papers and Proceedings of a
Conference of The American Society of International Law 359 (1971).
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ment made immediately before. Perhaps this is to be expected when conferences
are held at the Villa Serbelloni.
Thereafter, the group carefully stalked the theme to uncover a number of
thorny implications not immediately evident. For example, exactly what does the
term "decision" mean in this context?2 To what extent does the term's meaning
depend upon the methods provided for decision-making in the constitutional or
governing document of each institution? And in what sense is the term "effective"
to be understood? 3 A decision might be effective in the sense that it is a proper
method of attempting to achieve a predetermined objective. It can be effective in
the sense that it is so designed as to encourage and assure compliance, i.e., every-
one favors it and has to give up little to obtain the benefit to be derived from it.
Or it can be effective in the sense that it is within the clear authority of the
body making the decision and is realistically enforceable even against most or
all of those who will consciously attempt to avoid it.
What is meant by the term "decision" in the international setting looms large
in at least the first third of the transcript. Ideally, to most lawyers, a decision
ought to be made with all the formalities of law, i.e., voted upon, approved and
recorded and published as an official act of the organization. In practice, how-
ever, as is pointed out, decisions of international organizations are often made
in an informal setting where the binding quality and legal effect of the decision
is not clear. A decision may be only a "gentlemen's agreement" subject to revo-
cation at will.4 Or it may be observed in practice over a sufficiently long period
of time to mature into a legally binding precedent. Informal decision-making
may be desirable when the formal processes in the organization are too slow or
cumbersome, or when weighted voting is used and less influential members are
likely to have little voice or when, due to changed circumstances, established
rules of the organization must be informally "reinterpreted" so that it may
realistically continue to function.'
The group's far ranging discussion of the many different kinds of decisions,
recommendations and communications made by international institutions in a
variety of different settings points out the futility in attempting a precise defini-
tion of the term "decision." As a result, one is lead to question whether the theme
of the conference was properly or most usefully formulated. In retrospect, it
might have been more productive for the theme to be limited to legally binding
decisions rather than the whole range of possible decisions. Alternatively, it might
also have been most productive to reverse the thrust of the topic so as to inquire
into the elements which make up an effective decision on the premise that if we
can properly identify and categorize those types of international decisions which
have tended to be effective, we may learn more about how to make effective
international decisions in the future.
2. Id. at 368-84.
3. Id. at 385-90.
4. Id. at 375-77.
5. Id. at 376-7. See also J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 59-62 (6th ed. H. Waldock
1963).
6. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 412-21.
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The latter portion of the group discussion addressed itself to problems of
compliance with international decisions. 7 The basic elements or techniques of
obtaining compliance have been spelled out in the discussion and are not new
although some of the nuances were enlightening. The notion of the "mobiliza-
tion of shame"8 as a technique for obtaining compliance, although colorfully
clothed, is more commonly identified, particularly with respect to the United
Nations, as the rallying of public opinion against transgressors of the will of
the international community. What is noteworthy about the discussion of the
notion is the differing opinions expressed as to its utility. Whereas it might prove
to be effective to some degree with respect to a universal organization such as
the United Nations, it was considered to be of doubtful value by some of those
representing the functional organizations. For one, a given member nation in a
specialized organization such as the International Monetary Fund or the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization may fail to comply with a decision be-
cause it simply is a poor nation without the resources to comply. Further, the
activities of such organizations are not widely publicized and are sufficiently
technical in nature to make it difficult for the public to draw the issue of right
and wrong very clearly. Consequently, it is a technique not often utilized in
such organizations. As a representative of the Inter-American Development
Bank cogently points out: "[O]ur important sanction is that we could stop
making loans to a country."19
It would appear from the transcript that the specialized or functional inter-
national organizations use two other important devices to obtain compliance
which are less commonly relied upon in an organization such as the United
Nations. The first is to require members to periodically report the steps they
are taking to comply with decisions and to submit these reports to panels of
"neutral" experts who evaluate the reports.10 The second is to provide technical
and other assistance to help members who evidence a desire to comply but are
having difficulties in doing so." Obviously, such assistance is more meaningful
and more often welcomed in a technical context than in a political setting where
human values rather than slide rule methods are being applied.
A somewhat novel technique of obtaining compliance outlined in E. Lauter-
pacht's paper's and discussed further in the transcript is that of enforcement
through national courts. 3 There is nothing novel in the general idea, but Pro-
fessor Lauterpacht's specific ideas are. In the case of the economic embargo of
exports from Southern Rhodesia ordered by the U.N. Security Council in 1966,
Professor Lauterpacht suggests that the Security Council could impose upon
Member States the obligation to assist the British Government in recovering
wrongfully exported goods. That is to say, the United Kingdom remains the
7. Id. at 502-17.
8. Id. at 447-56.
9. Id. at 384.
10. E.g., id. at 451-52.
11. E.g., id. at 435-36.
12. Id. at 57-65.
13. Id. at 507-12.
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de jure sovereign over Rhodesia and as such has the legal right to enact legisla-
tion providing for vesting of title in the United Kingdom to goods of Rhodesian
origin intended for export in violation of the Security Council embargo. This
would give the British Government a legal basis for suing in foreign courts for
the goods illegally exported or their value. Such an approach would obviously
discourage purchasers depending upon the extent to which the foreign courts
recognized the validity in their courts of the British legislation. Of course, if the
Security Council resolution imposed a duty upon Member States to assist the
United Kingdom in enforcing the resolution, failure of members to take steps
necessary to assure enforcement of the British legislation in their courts could
be viewed as a violation of an international obligation. It is a suggestion worth
further consideration.
In general, for this reader the book was a disappointment. So far as the
papers were concerned, and they consume a major portion of the book, my re-
action parallels that of Gerald Fitzgerald, Senior Legal Officer of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, who stated during the proceedings: "I
read the various papers with great interest and was greatly enlightened as to
what the various organizations are doing in practice. But I found myself con-
fused because I was unable to make a complete synthesis of these activities in
my own mind."'14 A synthesis of the papers is in fact difficult because too many
of them deal with the mechanics of decision making in specific institutional
settings rather than with the broader topic of the book-the effectiveness of in-
ternational decisions.
The proceedings were, as a result, more stimulating and fruitful in terms of
the topic covered by the book. My principal problem with the proceedings was
the feeling that they were not sufficiently focused. Part of that problem arose
out of the theme itself, which presented definitional problems. Part of the diffi-
culty seemed to flow from the failure of the participants to make any judgments
as to when and under what circumstances decisions of international institutions
ought to be expected or required to be effective and under what circumstances
their effectiveness may not be as relatively important. The decision of the Secu-
rity Council to order a ceasefire among two of its members ought to somehow
be made effective in most cases. One would probably be less inclined to worry
about the effectiveness of a decision of the Universal Postal Union to make in-
ternational postal rates between two given points uniform both ways. Likewise,
the extent to which an international decision is likely to be effective depends
probably more upon the extent to which it may adversely affect vital interests
of member states than upon the legal framework within which it is made. Con-
siderations such as these seem to be missing from the discussion. What the pro-
ceedings as well as many of the papers confirm is that any legal arrangement,
whether conventional or novel in character, will be successful largely to the ex-
tent that it acknowledges human realities, the most important aspect of which,
in this context, is man's willingness to defend and fight to preserve those things
he considers to be of great value. Such things, if given up without a fight, are
14. Id. at 365.
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parted with because something of equal or greater value is received in exchange.
In the case of the "functional" international organizations, things of great value
are generally available to members which outweigh what must be given up to
obtain such benefits. Unfortunately, cities, populations and perhaps mankind
have not yet become large enough values to states to induce them to give up
any significant amounts of independence to achieve orderly and continuing
civilizations. Yet, it is here that the question of the effectiveness of interna-
tional decisions is most pertinent and where international lawyers have still,
perhaps, to define their roles.
F.. HARTMAN*
Commentary on the Conflict of Laws. By Russel J. Weintraub. Mineola:
The Foundation Press, Inc. 1971. Pp. xviii, 494. $13.50.
The "writing explosion" of the last decade in the field of conflict of laws' has
so far not reached the area of textbooks. The growing acceptance by courts of a
radically different approach to conflicts, encouraged by an extreme reluctance of
the United States Supreme Court to limit the states' freedom both in choice of
law2 and jurisdiction,3 has produced so many law review articles that since its
1964-67 edition, the Index to Legal Periodicals has found it necessary to sub-
divide the heading of "Conflict of Laws." 4 All four casebooks currently in use
were either published or substantially revised since 1965.6 In comparison, the
"post-Babcock"G era had, until publication of the book here being reviewed,
produced mainly two revisions of previously published texts.7
* Member of the Michigan and Ohio bars.
1. Complaints about the increase of published materials in the field of conflict of laws are
not a new phenomenon. In 1881 Francis Wharton wrote in the preface to the second edition
of his treatise: "Since the publication of the first edition of this book [in 1872] the literature
on the topic has more than doubled. In the United States, we have as many rulings bearing
on private international law since 1870 as were reported prior to that period." F. Wharton,
A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws iii (3d ed. 1905).
2. See, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964).
3. Not since Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), has the Supreme Court struck down
a state-court judgment for going beyond the constitutional limits of state jurisdiction.
4. 14 Index to Legal Periodicals 1964-67.
5. R. Cramton & D. Currie, Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments--Questions (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Cramton & Currie]; W. Reese & M. Rosenberg, Cases and Materials on Con-
flict of Laws (6th ed. 1971); E. Scoles & R. Weintraub, Cases and Materials on Conflict of
Laws (1967); A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems: Cases and
Materials on Conflict of Laws (1965) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren & Trautman].
6. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.YS.2d 743 (1963).
7. H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964); A. Leflar, American Conflicts
Law (1968). The Leflar book is so complete a revision of his prior book, The Law of Con-
flict of Laws (1959), that for all practical purposes it may be considered a new book. In addi-
tion, the von Mehren & Trautman casebook, supra note 5, might also be considered a textbook
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The reason for this reluctance to rush into print with new textbooks on conflict
of laws, presumably shared by authors and publishers alike, is easily understood.
A textbook,8 as distinguished from other writings, is supposed to give a precise
and systematic presentation of the current state of a field of law. In addition, the
investment of time, effort and money is hardly justifiable unless there is a reason-
able expectation that the book will remain current and useful for a certain num-
ber of years. Obviously these aims are difficult to achieve today in view of rapid
changes in the law and the existence of considerable doctrinary confusion in the
field of conflicts. That these goals can be achieved is shown by Professor Leflar's
book9 which has remained remarkably current in the nearly three years since its
publication, due in part to the fact that Professor Leflar's eclectic and common-
sense approach has found considerable acceptance in the courts. The book thus
remains up to date because it not only mirrors the law but has helped to shape it
as well.
Professor Weintraub has now judged the time ripe for summing up the law of
conflicts in a new textbook. The author's ideas on conflict of laws are well known
through a series of law review articles published over the past decade, most of
which have been incorporated into the book, some in rewritten form, the more
recent ones practically verbatim. On the whole, Professor Weintraub favors an
interest-analysis approach, though he prefers to call it "functional analysis"10
and speaks of "policies"" underlying the conflicting rules rather than "state
interests."'12 This general orientation should be acceptable to all but the represen-
tatives of the two extremes, namely, adherents of the territorial tradition18 (now
mostly found on a decreasing number of courts) and those who propose an even
more radical change in approach than many writers, 14 and certainly the majority
of our courts,' 5 would be willing to consider at present.' 0 Within this general
because it contains much original textual material and is cited more frequently by courts and
other authors than is customary for a casebook. The somewhat arbitrary cut-off date of Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), disqualifies for
present purposes A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962); G. Stumberg,
Principles of Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1963). Two later less likely books, A. Ehrenzweig, Con-
flicts in a Nutshell (2d ed. 1970), and A. Ehrenzweig & D. Loulsell, Jurisdiction in a Nutshell
(2d ed. 1968), seem to belong to a different category.
8. Several books have been published which are intended to explain their respective au-
thor's approach rather than to present a systematic survey of the law. See R. Weintraub,
Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 4-7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Weintraub].
9. See note 7 supra.
10. Weintraub vii-viii.
11. Id. at 39.
12. Id. at 266.
13. E.g., In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921) ; White v. Tennant, 31
W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888); see Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 202 (1969).
14. E.g., Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev.
637 (1960).
15. E.g., Browning v. Shackelford, 196 So. 2d 365 (Miss. 1967); Cherokee Laboratories,
Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965).
16. See, e.g., A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962).
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framework, however, the author does not hesitate to be original and to offer his
own answers to some of the thornier problems of conflicts.
Any publication must be judged by how well it achieves the author's purpose
and not by the type of book the reviewer thinks should have been written. Profes-
sor Weintraub defines his purpose as follows:
The aim is to afford the lawyer, judge, or law student, a dearer understanding of those
[American conflict of laws] problems.... A major concern of this book is to explain
the new methodology in terms that readers who are not conflicts professors can under-
stand and apply.17
This underscores two of the essential issues to be faced by anyone who wishes
to present a comprehensive picture of today's conflict of laws, namely the degree
to which the author feels it necessary to discuss competing theories and the over-
all arrangement of the contents of a textbook on conflicts.
For a long time the courts refused to pay attention to the changes in conflicts
thinking among the writers on the subject and continued to adhere to the rigid
territorial characterization approach of the first Restatement of Conflict of
Laws.18 During that period the increasing number of law professors who advo-
cated radical changes found themselves mostly talking to each other in their
articles and books on the subject. As a consequence of that isolation of the aca-
demic approaches to conflicts from the touchstone of court decisions and judicial
opinions their writings became more and more abstract, not to say esoteric. 10
Needless to say, under such circumstances no consensus could crystallize as to
what should replace the old order which so stubbornly refused to pass away. The
great change started in the early sixties when the courts first began admitting
that they were only paying lip-service to the old Restatement and proceded to
test the new theories openly and frankly. Today, consequently, we have more
divergent theories in conflict of laws than in most other branches of the law, and
the fight continues as to what direction future developments should take. This
multitude of proposed methods and aims, with only incipient guidance by the
courts, creates a dilemma for the author of a textbook. If he presents only his
own approach, the book becomes a partisan tract; if he pays attention even to
only the leading theories, the reader will be confused and feel that he has not been
given an answer to his question. Either way, the book runs the danger of failing
in its purpose to serve as a guide for practitioners and students.
With regard to the second basic issue mentioned above, namely the overall
arrangement of the contents, the solution appeared obvious so long as the answer
to conflicts problems was at least ostensibly based on the process of characteriza-
17. Weintraub vii.
18. Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1934).
19. Even law professors appear to share this feeling and occasionally express it in picturesque
language. Professor Ratner has compared conflicts to Matthew Arnolds' "Dover Beach," where
"on a darkling plain ... ignorant armies dash by night." Ratner, Reflections of a Traynor
Law Clerk-With Some Emphasis on Conflict of Laws, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 876A, 876B-C
(1971). Dean Prosser has called the realm of conflicts "a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors ...." Prosser, Interstate Publica-
tion, 51 Mch. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953), quoted in Weintraub 2-3.
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tion. If the answer to conflicts problems depended on whether the case fell within
the field of torts, contracts, family law or any of the other pigeon-holes familiar
to lawyers from the time they first looked at the curriculum of any law school, it
was only natural to use this classification for the chapter headings of a conflicts
text. If, on the other hand, characterization is completely abandoned, if conflicts
is considered mostly as a general methodology, subdivision by subject matter
would appear not to make much sense and to lead only to unnecessary repetition
of the same guidelines. There are two difficulties with this extreme position. As
pointed out elsewhere20 the most recent casebook which abandons at least in
part the organization by subject matter21 finds it impossible to be fully consistent
and reintroduces some element of characterization in its arrangement of cases
and notes. This is difficult to avoid because some of the relevant factors, such as
intent or reliance, will be given different weight in, for instance, negligence or
contract cases.
In addition, the organization of a book must also take into account the type of
reader for whom it is intended. A law student being trained in the new methodol-
ogy of conflicts may find it to his advantage to be presented separately with each
of the factors to be considered in a conflicts problem and the impact of that factor
on cases arising from different types of relationships.22 On the other hand, a judge
or practicing lawyer who uses the book as a reference work can hardly be ex-
pected to read the entire work in the hope that at various places he will find dis-
cussions of his specific problem from different angles. If he seeks the answer to a
"contracts" case in conflicts he expects the entire problem to be treated in one
chapter under the appropriate heading. 23
In dealing with these problems, Professor Weintraub keeps in mind that he is
writing for lawyers, judges and law students. He avoids a detailed, systematic
discussion of the various theories. Instead, he summarizes in a few pages the
positions taken by the leading writers24 and, from then on, presents the law as
he sees it. For the most part this means a short presentation of the traditional
rules followed by his criticism through an analysis of leading cases and, by way
of conclusion, the author's own solution to the problem. The overall organization
of the book follows the traditional method, the contents being divided in accord-
ance with the accepted subject matter headings.
This method permits easier use of the book as a reference work. It also causes,
however, a certain amount of repetition and makes it more difficult for the reader
to achieve an understanding of Professor Weintraub's basic method which must
be gleened from repeated references thereto in the various chapters. Thus, for
instance, the author's functional approach, his criteria for distinguishing between
false and true conflicts through an analysis of the policies underlying the conflict-
20. Schwind, Book Review, 17 Am. J. Comp. L. 633, 634-35 (1969).
21. Cramton & Currie, supra note 5.
22. The casebook which most consistently follows this approach is von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 5.
23. This is probably one of the reasons that the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
(1971) has maintained the traditional chapter headings.
24. Weintraub 4-7.
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ing rules and solution of true conflicts through a determination of the jurisdiction
with the "predominant interest" is discussed with considerable overlapping in a
general chapter called "The 'Pervasive Problems' of the Conflict of Laws"3 as
well as in the chapters on Torts,20 Property27 and a few other places. Similarly,
the author's interesting suggestion that a court should not attempt to judge which
of two conflicting rules is the "better" one but, everything else begin equal,
should apply the rule which is more in accord with objectively determinable
trends in the development of the law, is buried, and repeated, in the chapters
on Torts28 and Contracts.29
As stated above, a considerable part of the book has drawn from prior articles
by Professor Weintraub in which he made his valuable contributions to the de-
velopment of the law. While many of these articles have been rewritten, "to make
this book an integrated coverage of the subject rather than a loose collection of
essays," 30 the respective chapters still bear evidence of the polemic style and the
detailed analyses of a few leading cases which characterize law review articles.
The second chapterzl dealing with domicile may serve as example of the above;
it also shows that substantial difficulties are created by using the traditional dis-
tribution of material in a book essentially following the modem method of analy-
sis. At a time when domicile was one of the most widely used connecting factors
in conflicts and deemed to have the same meaning under all circumstances, it was
appropriate and advisable to dedicate a special introductory chapter to this con-
cept. In the present book, however, the chapter on domicile consists of two parts
which are very different in style and approach. The first part contains a short,
uncritical summary of the rules of domicile in typical "Hornbook" fashion. The
second, much longer part of the chapter analyzes through a detailed discussion of
a few leading cases the usefulness of the concept of domicile in solving problems
of interstate succession to movables, the validity of a will disposing of movables,
the capacity of a wife to sue her husband for negligence, and domicile as a consti-
tutional basis for judicial jurisdiction. In each of these areas, the author concludes
that domicile is not the appropriate tool for handling the problem and his general
conclusion is that we "need not, therefore should not, speak of 'domicile' at all."-"-
The conclusion certainly has much merit and the type of analysis used is very
appropriate for a law review,33 or a book intended to be theoretical and polemic.
It is somewhat strange, however, to find nearly an entire chapter of a textbook
dedicated to a concept which the author destroys step by step and finally rejects
completely. Furthermore, the various substantive matters discussed in this chapter
25. Id. at 39-64.
26. Id. at 200-62.
27. Id. at 296-377.
28. Id. at 207.
29. Id. at 285.
30. Id. at vii.
31. Id. at 8-38.
32. Id. at 38.
33. The second part of the chapter has been adapted from Weintraub, An Inquiry into the
Utility of "Domicile" as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 961 (1965).
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appear later on in their appropriate place as sub-chapter headings where they are
dealt with mostly by references back to Chapter Two. This avoids repetition but
also breaks the continuity of presentation and underlines the difficulties encoun-
tered in any attempt to pour new wine into old bottles.
On one essential point the author departs from the traditional arrangement of
the subject-there is no separate chapter dealing with recognition of foreign
judgments. Special types of judgment (divorce, real property, etc.) are covered
in their respective chapters. The more general aspects of the problem are dealt
with in Chapter Nine under the heading "Constitutional Limitations on Choice
of Law,"34 which, in turn, is subdivided into sections dealing, respectively, with
the effects of the due process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution.
The chapter thus joins discussions of the constitutional impact on choice of law
in the primary adjudicatory process and in the field of judgments. The author
offers no explanation for this treatment but the reason for it becomes apparent
if one considers his approach to full faith and credit. He maintains that in cases
involving both choice of law in the usual sense of the word and recognition of
foreign judgments, the full faith and credit standard is the same. In the first case,
we have to weigh the competing interests of sister states, in the second case the
interests of a state against the need for national uniformity." From the point
of view of theoretical analysis, there is much merit to this position. However,
Professor Weintraub himself concedes that this is "more than a slight shift in
emphasis."361 In view of the very different attitudes taken by the Supreme Court
in choice-of-law37 and judgment cases, 88 the less sophisticated might well prefer
to think that, in effect, we have two different rules and thus the joint treatment
of the two only blurs the difference in outcome. Again, the author's approach ap-
pears appropriate for the law review article from which the chapter was adapted 0
but it is confusing in a textbook.
This review has intentionally focused on the technical aspects of the book
rather than on Professor Weintraub's substantive approach to the problems of
conflict of laws. This has been done in part because most of his ideas are already
well known through his previous writings, in part because a discussion of the
author's views would have required comparison with competing theories inviting
the same metaphysical considerations which Professor Weintraub deplores40 and
avoids in his book. Enough has been said above to give a general idea of Professor
Weintraub's use of interest analysis. Suffice it to add that where proper he de-
parts from this position in advocating, for instance, a form of "rule of validation"
which will permit upholding, whenever possible, the individual intent in situations
34. Weintraub 399-422.
35. Id. at 411.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Crider v. Zurick Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
38. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436-37 (1943).
39. Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of
Law, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449 (1959).
40. Weintraub 3.
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where this element is properly considered, such as in the case of wills" and con-
tracts.4
2
In addition to the subject matters discussed above, the book contains chapters
dealing with jurisdiction to adjudicateS family relations,44 property" and choice
of law in the federal courts.46 A sub-chapter47 dealing critically with the conflicts
rules of the Uniform Commercial Code48 deserves special mention because not all
conflicts scholars have paid this subject the attention it deserves. In most chap-
ters, the author uses the previously mentioned dual method, i.e., he presents a
short summary of accepted rules under the traditional headings followed by an
analysis in depth of those problems which in his opinion require a new approach.
While Professor Weintraub on the whole avoids polemics with other authors, he
does not hesitate to take issue with the Second Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws, approving or criticizing it as he deems appropriate.
In conclusion, Professor Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws
is an interesting and stimulating book to read. His ideas deserve attention and
he succeeds in piercing the fog of rhetoric which too long has enshrouded the sub-
ject. On the other hand, he has not been entirely successful in his professed aim
of combining the ideas expressed in his previous writings into a systematic com-
mentary. The reader, depending on his objectives and degree of sophistication in
the area of conflicts, will have to pick his way between those parts which are
summarily expository in nature and those other sections which contain detailed
analysis and innovative ideas.
MChUEL A. ScHwnND*
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id. at 284.
43. Ch. 4, id. at 65-167.
44. Ch. 5, id. at 168-99.
45. Ch. 8, id. at 296-377.
46. Ch. 10, id. at 427-66.
47. Id. at 345-77.
48. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-105, 9-102-03.
* Professor of Law, New York University.
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